Scott’s ‘National Plan’ Fails: What Now? | Exclusive Interview with Wang Xiaoyi

Foodthink says

On 19 July 2024, James C. Scott, Professor of Political Science at Yale University, passed away. Immediately, a wave of commemorative articles began to re-examine his ideas on peasants and agriculture, everyday resistance, state and society, and anarchism.

James Scott began by studying peasant struggles before turning to broader issues, eventually becoming a widely influential thinker. From Foodthink’s perspective, the trajectory of his lifelong research reveals that peasants and agrarian societies possess a unique value for modern society that transcends the issues themselves.

Why, then, has Scott garnered such attention in China? What is the most significant legacy he has left for the Chinese intelligentsia? And how should we use Scott’s lens to view contemporary Chinese society?

To this end, Foodthink interviewed Wang Xiaoyi, a researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who also translated two of Scott’s works into Chinese: Seeing Like a State and *The Art of Not Being Governed*. In 2007, Wang Xiaoyi helped organise Scott’s first visit to China, the results of which were published in *Scott and the Chinese Countryside: Research and Dialogue*.

● James Scott in the urban-rural fringe of Beijing, a location that serves as the ideal setting to explain his theory of subaltern spontaneity.

Foodthink Author
Wang Xiaoyi
Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Director of the Centre for Rural Environment and Society. His primary research areas include rural sociology, with a particular focus on rural poverty, the rural environment, and community development. He has authored or co-authored books such as *Poverty Investigation of 12 Chinese Villages*, *Grassland Communities Under Environmental Pressure*, and *Climate Change and Social Adaptation: A Study Based on the Pastoral Areas of Inner Mongolia*. He has translated and published *Rural Social Change*, *Seeing Like a State*, and *The Art of Not Being Governed*, and has published dozens of papers on the rural environment and poverty governance.

 

Foodthink: Since Scott’s passing, many scholars in China have used the occasion of mourning him to re-articulate his ideas, demonstrating his significant influence on Chinese intellectual circles. Why has Scott received so much attention domestically? Beyond academia, has he had a more tangible impact on China’s practices and social development?
Wang Xiaoyi: I believe Scott’s acceptance in China occurred in three stages. In the first stage, he was accepted by the Chinese academic community primarily as one of the key authors in the field of peasant studies. As we know, after World War II, and especially in the 1960s, a group of Western scholars emerged who focused on peasants, their resistance, and their economic, social, and cultural characteristics. In their view, peasant societies differed from other social strata; to understand guerrilla warfare in colonial states, one had to understand the peasantry. Among these scholars, Scott’s concepts of the ‘moral economy of the peasant’ and the ‘weapons of the weak’ undoubtedly became essential frameworks for understanding peasant societies.

A key argument in *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* is that peasant resistance is not triggered by a direct loss of material interest, but by perceived injustice. In other words, peasants have their own standards for ‘what is just’, and they resist when these standards are violated. Supporting this notion of justice is a moral economy of patronage and reciprocity formed from the peasants’ own conditions of survival. In *Weapons of the Weak*, he analyses the low-cost methods of resistance adopted by peasants—as the marginalised—in their daily lives: passive sabotage, foot-dragging, rumours, and various forms of non-cooperation.

That Scott became known to Chinese scholars as a specialist in peasant studies may be attributed to two reasons: first, Qin Hui’s leadership in editing and translating the *Peasant Studies Series* in the 1980s, which promoted the translation of *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*; and second, Philip Huang’s categorical analysis of the peasant research tradition in *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China*, which discussed Scott’s theories.

Furthermore, the influence of these two works on peasants in China may be directly related to the reality of the time. China’s rural reforms called for a reappraisal of peasant society; peasants were no longer viewed as a backward class in need of transformation, but as a vital force driving reform. Simultaneously, in the 1990s, social conflicts in the countryside began to attract increasing academic attention. Thus, Scott’s terminology—such as ‘the subaltern’, ‘the weak’, and ‘hidden transcripts’—provided conceptually rich tools for understanding the social conflicts of that era.

It should be noted that Scott’s influence during this period was concentrated within academia, particularly within the circle of peasant studies.

● James Scott’s two works on peasant resistance in Southeast Asia: *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* and *Weapons of the Weak*.
Foodthink: Following those two books, the next work by Scott published in China was *Seeing Like a State*. You translated this book, and it can be considered an academic bestseller. Since then, Scott became a ‘star’ in China. Why do you think it generated such a strong reaction?
Wang Xiaoyi: The Chinese edition of *Seeing Like a State* was published in 2004. As we know, this book is difficult to categorise into a single discipline; its influence transcended disciplinary boundaries and entered the broader intellectual sphere. I didn’t translate this book for academic reasons, but because it resonated with me while I was reading it. At the time, due to my work, I was involved in several large-scale rural development and ecological protection projects and policies, some driven by international agencies and others by the government. Throughout my engagement with these projects, I always felt a vast distance between the implementation process and effects and the original design—sometimes they were even diametrically opposed. So, when a friend gave me this book, I was first attracted by the subtitle: *How Certain Schemes for Improving the Human Condition Have Failed*.

From my observation, after the Chinese translation was published, it didn’t first influence professional scholars, but rather people engaged in social practice, such as development practitioners and social organisations working on the rural front line. Later, it gradually gained significant influence among young students, policymakers, and scholars concerned with social reality.

I believe two core concepts in the book had a major impact. First is failure. Acknowledging that many meticulously designed projects fail, and viewing the process of human modernisation—specifically the state’s intervention in nature and society—from the perspective of failure, is a new way of thinking. Many failures are not merely accidental or the result of a few individuals’ mistakes; they are caused by systemic errors. In fact, the more meticulous the design, the more likely it is to lead to failure.

Secondly, there is the question of *why* they fail. The reason is that the state replaces existing complexity and diversity with a simple, legible social design. Because such simple and clear designs bring about many unpredictable consequences, the stronger the state’s capacity to intervene in nature and society, the greater the risks involved.

I think the book brought people resonance rather than shock. We had all seen similar phenomena occurring but lacked a systematic way of thinking about them. Consequently, many readers could share stories of their own similar experiences after reading the book, as it sparked a process of reflection.

Scott’s cross-disciplinary influence is directly related to the widespread reading of *Seeing Like a State* among Chinese readers. Following this, Scott’s image evolved from being just an expert on peasants to being an intellectual who critiqued the state and modernisation. This marks the second stage of Scott’s acceptance in China.

● The English and Chinese covers of *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes for Improving the Human Condition Have Failed*.

Foodthink: Do you think the theory of “participatory development” proposed in rural development projects at that time had any connection to Scott?

Wang Xiaoyi: Around the time *Seeing Like a State* was published, development theories had already entered China, and “participation” was adopted as a primary tool. Participatory development requires the involvement of local residents, and the underlying assumption actually incorporates the concept of “local knowledge”, which shares similarities with the “metis” mentioned by Scott in *Seeing Like a State*. However, I don’t think there is much of a direct link between *Seeing Like a State* and participatory development—at least, I haven’t seen one. Their objectives and methods differ: *Seeing Like a State* helps us understand why projects fail and recognise the role of the modern state in development; participatory development, on the other hand, is more of a tool intended to make development projects more successful. One is about understanding failure, the other about facilitating success. While they seem intrinsically linked, they may actually operate on two entirely different logics.

It cannot be said that participatory development had no effect after being introduced to China. On a micro level, it did solve some development problems, made project designs more rational, increased the enthusiasm of farmers to participate, and utilised certain types of local knowledge. However, at the same time, “participation” also became a tool for outside experts to collect information more quickly, complete project designs, and write polished evaluation reports. Looking back now, many participatory development projects ultimately failed because the inequalities of power, resources, and knowledge inherent in the development process cannot be resolved by participation alone.

Foodthink: If state-led engineering is problematic, and participatory methods also encounter issues in practice, then what should the correct path be? Does Scott have any views on this?
Wang Xiaoyi: As I read Scott, I felt a growing sense of his resignation. In fact, while his analysis of how large-scale, state-led social engineering fails is logically clear and very persuasive, he struggles to provide more concrete advice on how to solve these problems. He can only suggest that we keep trying and remain vigilant against failure.

In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, when analysing pre-modern states, he describes the autonomy of highland dwellers and how they evade state control with great explanatory power. But when he enters the discourse of the modern state, his analysis becomes vague; he even creates a historical divide, emphasising that his analysis applies only to pre-modern states.

Although Scott proposes “metis” and emphasises locality, we see that these suggestions are neither explicit nor particularly powerful. In fact, Elinor Ostrom, who also advocated for decentralisation, often expressed similar views, believing there is no silver bullet for solving these problems.

Of course, we could argue that the diversity, endogeneity, and spontaneity they advocate may be important methods for solving problems, but they are certainly not the only ones. Especially as we see globalisation gradually waning and the role of the nation-state being strengthened, no one can deny that the nation-state is a crucial factor in solving problems. In this sense, Scott’s resignation is not merely his own, but a resignation faced by all of us.

● A typical “state-led plan”: Over the past few decades, the state has implemented environmental projects in the northern grasslands, such as grazing bans, rotational grazing, and the conversion of cultivated land back to grassland. However, for various reasons, these projects did not achieve the intended results. Photo: Shuni
Foodthink: If we judge a project solely by its success, state-led engineering may have succeeded in many dimensions—for example, the top-down poverty alleviation campaign. But what happens next? To find healthy, sustainable development, do we need to rely on “diversity”, allowing ordinary people to find their own ways to survive? The concern now is that certain policies and governance models might stifle this diversity.
Wang Xiaoyi: Personally, I feel that the answer to this question doesn’t lie in our judgement, but in looking back at history. History is cyclical, and this cycle often oscillates between state planning and social spontaneity. We need to see not only the successes and failures of the state, but also those of grassroots spontaneity. Often, two sides of a problem coexist. For instance, spontaneity brings social vitality, but we must also recognise the problems it creates. When the issues caused by spontaneity accumulate over a period—such as threats to social order, social justice, and social rights—the corrective power of the state is required. Conversely, when excessive state control saps social vitality, social spontaneity is emphasised.

If we review the history of rural social governance since 1949, we can see a cyclical process of loosening and tightening control. After 1949, farmers gained land and production enthusiasm increased, but new disparities in wealth and power soon emerged. Subsequently, through the People’s Commune system, state power penetrated deep into the rural grassroots, and the production and lives of farmers were highly controlled. Then came the Reform and Opening-up period, during which the state gradually relaxed its control over rural society, but many problems emerged, including wealth gaps, official corruption, and organized crime. In the new era, the state has strengthened its management of rural society; the form-filling, grid-based management, and the frequently criticised formalistic inspections and evaluations that people complain about today are all products of this trend. We also see a shift in the priorities of decision-makers—from the establishment of fault-tolerance mechanisms to reducing the burden on grassroots levels and proposing “empowerment”—suggesting a desire to grant the grassroots more space and flexibility. I believe society advances gradually through this winding process. Every policy adjustment has its own underlying logic.

Secondly, we must recognise the process of policy trial and error. At least from my personal experience, policy formulation leaves room for adjustment. In the short term, we often see policies that are ill-suited, or even policies that encounter many problems during implementation. However, over the long term, we often see policies being adjusted and refined. This adjustment and refinement is a process of trial and error.

Foodthink: Returning to Scott’s theories, what is the significance of criticising state planning in China? Is grassroots wisdom and agency important?
Wang Xiaoyi: In my view, firstly, it is meaningless to criticise Scott for not providing solutions; not all scholars can be think-tank experts. Look at the great thinkers in history—how many could provide a definitive solution to a problem? Secondly, it is also incorrect to simply accept Scott’s views without question. We need to look at Scott dialectically. While Scott criticises the state’s drive towards legibility and simplification, to some extent, Scott himself struggles with issues of simplification. As his good friend Edward Friedman once criticised, the historical interpretation of the Southeast Asian highlands in *The Art of Not Being Governed* may be somewhat overly simplified. However, the reason Scott has such a wide influence in China—becoming, in a sense, almost an academic bestseller author—lies in the following:

First, Scott’s explanations always feel refreshing and inspiring; they make the reader feel, “How could this problem be viewed in this way?” For example, in *Seeing Like a State*, he divides crops into “proletarian” and “petit-bourgeois”—the former referring to storable grain crops, and the latter to delicate berries. In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, he divides crops into “state crops” and “escape crops”. The former are crops like rice, which grow on the surface and ripen at the same time, making them easy for the state to tax; the latter, like cassava, are buried deep underground and can be left unharvested for a long time, making them difficult for the state to seize. Similarly, the flight of highland dwellers from valley states and the state’s capture of escaping populations are not merely discussions of historical phenomena, but attempts to create new interpretations of the state and power. All these perspectives are deeply inspiring.

● The concept of “state crops” proposed by Scott in *The Art of Not Being Governed* was later developed into a systematic discourse on the historical origins of the state and agriculture in the book *Against the Grain*.
Secondly, his work serves as a warning to readers regarding human rationality, state planning, and the process of modernisation; it makes us realise that human reason and state power are not omnipotent. While they may bring superficial prosperity and development, they also create latent problems. When individuals and states maintain a prudent attitude toward these forces, errors may not be entirely avoidable, but they are likely to be less severe and, once they occur, easier to rectify. Thirdly, I believe that Scott’s analysis gives us greater confidence in the adaptability of grassroots society. We often see large-scale planning projects facing numerous issues, yet looking back at these projects after ten, twenty, or more years, we find that society has developed new ways of operating through adaptive changes.

Take some ecological migration projects, for example. When first implemented, they faced many problems, including the migrants’ lack of industry and their inability to adapt to the local environment. However, after several years, we found that the composition of the residents in these migration areas had changed: those who could not adapt had sold their new homes, while the newcomers brought their own survival strategies. The migration plan did not fail, but the migration area did not end up exactly as originally planned; rather, through adaptive development, the residents formed ways of existence different from those envisioned. If planning leaves some room for adaptive change, the difficulties of adjustment can be reduced, but even in the absence of such space, it will emerge spontaneously over time. Therefore, we should have full confidence in the spontaneous adaptation of society.

Finally, Scott’s method of class analysis is something we frequently overlook. In fact, we often ignore his emphasis on class. “Weapons of the Weak” are not specifically the weapons of peasants—because there are both weak and strong among the peasantry—but are precisely the weapons of those at the very bottom of society. Evasion of the state is also not a universal action; only those at the bottom of society, who are concentrated to provide the state with material and human resources, will evade. Without class analysis, there is no perspective from the bottom, and many issues become blurred. For instance, when we frequently speak of “peasants” or “smallholders” today, we consciously or unconsciously ignore the fact that the peasantry is not a monolith. In today’s rural society, there are differing interests among peasants, and smallholders are not all “weak”. When reading Scott, or borrowing his perspective to observe society, we must remember not to neglect class analysis.

Foodthink: Scott visited China twice, first in 2007 and again in 2012. You were involved in organising the first visit; what was the situation like at the time?
Wang Xiaoyi: I had two encounters with him in Beijing. The first was when I invited him to visit. During that trip, he participated in a seminar at the Institute of Sociology and gave two lectures, one at Minzu University of China and another at Tsinghua University. The seminar at the Institute of Sociology was somewhat different from a typical lecture or workshop; it was organised by Professor Qu Jingdong and me. We didn’t want him to simply present his own research, as his primary works already had many readers in China, and his line of thinking had already inspired research results with distinct Chinese characteristics—a prime example being “resilient weapons”. Consequently, we took a new approach: we invited several scholars to use Scott’s concepts or logic to analyse contemporary social phenomena in China, and then asked Scott to provide his views and commentary on these findings. The final results were recorded in the book *Scott and the Chinese Countryside*. It was a quite interesting experiment; as for whether it was successful, readers can judge for themselves through that small volume.

Scott’s two lectures at Minzu University of China and Tsinghua University are also included in *Scott and the Chinese Countryside*. His talk at Minzu University was titled “Why Civilization is Difficult to Bring Up the Mountains”, which covered the core content of *The Art of Not Being Governed*, which he was writing at the time. The venue was absolutely packed—standing room only, with the aisles filled with listeners. In Scott’s own words, it was like being a celebrity. At Tsinghua University, he spoke primarily on *Seeing Like a State*.

He visited China a second time in 2012, invited by Professor Ye Jingzhong of the Agricultural University to give a talk at the “Agricultural Policy Lectures”. On that occasion, I also took him to Pi Village in Beijing to visit the Migrant Worker Culture and Art Museum.

● *Scott and the Chinese Countryside*, which includes Wang Xiaoyi’s article “Herders and the State Under Ecological Pressure”. In the collection *Grassland Communities Under Environmental Pressure*, Wang Xiaoyi uses six specific cases of grassland communities to create a dialogue with Scott’s theories on “state control” and “weapons of the weak”. Scott’s lecture transcript from Tsinghua University can also be found in Foodthink’s repost.
Foodthink: From your interactions with Scott, what was your impression of him as a person?
Wang Xiaoyi: I didn’t get to know him very deeply—we only met in person those two times—but I felt he was a very pure scholar. By “pure”, I mean that his attention was entirely focused on the academic questions he was discussing. His research wasn’t aimed at providing polished solutions for policymakers or society; in other words, he wasn’t a “think-tank” scholar. Nor was he a professional hack; part of his research funding in Myanmar came from advances on his royalties. Scott once said his passion was writing books, which I think truly captures his character. As an American intellectual, his political inclinations would occasionally surface, such as his dissatisfaction with Trump. He even joked with me once, asking if I knew anyone at the Beijing Zoo and whether Trump could be locked in the zoo for exhibition.

Foodthink: And how did Scott view China?
Wang Xiaoyi: I didn’t discuss Chinese affairs with him extensively, but I believe he was interested in China. He once mentioned that if China had allowed him to conduct fieldwork in the 1970s, he wouldn’t have gone to Indonesia; he would have chosen China as his field site. He also considered writing about the Great Leap Forward in *Seeing Like a State*, though that particular research was never completed. Secondly, he likely had some understanding of China because his close friend, Edward Friedman, is an expert on the Chinese countryside. He mentioned that he learned about rural China through Friedman. Furthermore, many Chinese scholars and students have interacted with him to varying degrees, so he must have some grasp of the situation in China, though I don’t know how profound it was. From my own observation, he was quite concerned with the influence he had in China. Particularly after the publication of *Seeing Like a State*, he felt the enthusiasm of the Chinese academic community. Consequently, before *The Art of Not Being Governed* was officially published, he invited me to translate the Chinese edition. Had it not been for the long publication cycle, the Chinese version might have been the first to be published after the English edition, but as they say, the road to success is often paved with obstacles. Throughout that process, he checked in several times regarding the progress of the Chinese publication.

Scott’s influence in China has now entered a third phase; he is no longer just an expert in peasant studies or an interdisciplinary scholar—his books have become academic bestsellers. If I recall correctly, his last few new books had Chinese translations published almost immediately after the English versions, and some of his earlier works have also been translated. There are reports that his final work before his passing (In Praise of Floods: The Stake of All Creatures in the River’s Freedom), which concerns the floods of the Ayeyarwady River, may be published in 2025. I suspect domestic publishers are already prepared. We look forward to this book finally being completed.

● 2007: James Scott attending a seminar at the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
● 2007: James Scott delivering the lecture “Why Civilization is Difficult to Bring Up the Mountains” at Minzu University of China, alongside the moderator, Professor Wang Mingming.
● James Scott and Wang Xiaoyi.

Unless otherwise stated, photos provided by the interviewee

Interviewed by: Tianle, Wang Hao

Edited by: Wang Hao