Low-carbon agriculture enters Document No. 1: What does it mean?

I. Climate Change in the No. 1 Document

However, this does not mean that the No. 1 Document—which has focused on agriculture, rural areas, and farmers for 22 consecutive years—is only now addressing the relationship between climate change and farming. As early as 2010, when climate change first appeared in the document, it was featured in the second paragraph, stating clearly from the outset: “The impact of climate change on agricultural production is increasing; while favourable conditions and positive factors for the development of agriculture and rural areas are accumulating, various traditional and non-traditional challenges are also becoming more prominent.” This shows that policymakers have long been aware of the immense impact climate change has on Chinese agriculture.

In 2012, again in the second paragraph, the No. 1 Document linked climate change to the challenges facing the nation’s agriculture, reflecting a strong sense of urgency: “The effects of global climate change are deepening, pressure on the shortage of arable land and freshwater resources in China is increasing, and the risks and uncertainties facing agricultural development have risen significantly, making the task of consolidating and developing the positive situation in agriculture and rural areas even more arduous.”

In the same year, within the section on agricultural technology extension, the document proposed a “substantial increase in subsidies for key technologies and best practices for agricultural disaster prevention, mitigation, and stable or increased production”, and called for expanding the coverage of public meteorological services in agricultural and rural areas to improve the scientific level of agricultural weather services and rural meteorological disaster prevention.

Interestingly, the word “climate” was largely absent from the No. 1 Document for a long period thereafter. It was not until 2022 that it made a prominent return, appearing in the very first paragraph with a severe tone, listed alongside the year’s most critical issues: “Currently, the global COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread, the recovery of the world economy remains fragile, the challenges of climate change are prominent, and the various tasks for China’s economic and social development are extremely heavy and arduous.” Furthermore, in the section on effectively preventing and responding to major agricultural disasters, it proposed to “strengthen research on the medium- and long-term impacts of climate change on agriculture.”

Yet, in the Central No. 1 Documents of those three years, climate change felt more like a vast, invisible shadow, without much in the way of specific operational deployment. It was not until 2023 that climate issues finally gained a concrete mechanism for action in the No. 1 Document. In the section on strengthening agricultural disaster prevention and mitigation capacity, it proposed to “research and carry out a new round of agricultural climate resource surveys and agricultural climate zoning.”

The results of this research were reflected in the 2026 Central No. 1 Document, where the word “research” was removed and the wording became a more direct call to action: “Carry out agricultural climate resource surveys and zoning, strengthen the monitoring, forecasting, and early warning of meteorological, hydrological, and geological disasters, and improve the capacity to respond to extreme weather.”

II. Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Climate Change

In recent years, there have been numerous sudden droughts, floods, and extreme weather events; disasters previously described as “once-in-fifty-years” or “once-in-a-century” now seem to occur almost annually. Last year alone, memorable floods continued to strike, particularly in Northern China: from 23 July, several northern regions experienced torrential rain, with 13 national meteorological stations recording historical highs. In Yi County, Hebei, it was said that “a year’s worth of rain fell in a single day”. In Miyun, the hardest-hit area of Beijing, a heavily invested farm was washed away; the land lost its topsoil and remains uncultivatable to this day, with economic losses reaching 30 million yuan.

By October, prolonged rain and waterlogging in the Huang-Huai-Hai and wider North China region hindered the autumn harvest. Wheeled combine harvesters struggled to enter the muddy fields, and drying equipment, such as drying towers, were insufficient, leading to the mould and decay of many farmers’ maize. In rural Hebei, water accumulated in low-lying flat fields and could not be drained. Meanwhile, Southwestern China suffered from consecutive droughts throughout winter and spring.

These extreme weather events can, to a greater or lesser extent, be attributed to climate change. The flooding in the main producing regions of the North has been particularly striking. In this year’s Central No. 1 Document, a specific proposal was made to “strengthen the construction of flood control and drainage systems in Northern regions and moderately raise engineering construction standards,” while emphasising the “allocation and deployment of disaster relief machinery.”

An insider close to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs told Foodthink that responding to extreme disasters caused by climate change is currently a priority for the Ministry. In recent years, the focus of China’s agricultural production system has been on enhancing agricultural resilience to prevent, mitigate, and provide relief for disasters. For example, in 2024, the Ministry established information-sharing mechanisms with the meteorological, water resources, and emergency management departments to monitor disasters, and holds monthly consultations with the Meteorological Bureau to release climate trend bulletins. They have also worked with four northeastern provinces (and regions) to renovate agricultural drainage canals in the North.

While climate change has previously appeared in the Central No. 1 Document primarily as an agricultural risk to be adapted to, the introduction of “low-carbon agriculture” for the first time this year is a positive signal that agriculture is now expected to play an active role in emission reductions. Although concepts similar to “low-carbon agriculture”—such as green development and ecological agriculture—have frequently appeared in the No. 1 Document, they have mostly served objectives related to pollution reduction and food security. Looking beyond the framework of the No. 1 Document, climate change—whether in terms of mitigation or adaptation—has been the overarching backdrop for the green development of Chinese agriculture since 2020.

However, the key to the success of “low-carbon agriculture” lies in ensuring that farmers benefit from it, rather than making them foot the bill for the green transition—whether through bans on straw burning or the challenges of winter heating in northern rural areas, unsuccessful examples already exist and must be reflected upon.

In September 2025, Foodthink published a report titled *Research on the Action Path of Rural Social Organisations in Responding to Climate Change*, noting that farmers have long been the most sensitive observers and victims of climate change, yet few resources are dedicated to supporting them.

At the same time, farmers face inequalities in both discourse and policy: from a mitigation perspective, small- and medium-sized farms—especially those engaged in ecological agriculture—have lower production and living emissions than large-scale industrial agriculture or urban residents, yet their contribution to emission reductions remains unrecognised; from an adaptation perspective, they are more sensitive and vulnerable than other groups.

On a practical level, based on interviews with numerous rural social organisations and frontline workers, Foodthink found that, driven by climate funders, many social organisations entered rural areas with the original intention of reducing emissions and pollution, hoping to decrease emissions of methane—one of the primary greenhouse gases produced by crop cultivation.

However, upon encountering the complex realities of rural life, they often find themselves first having to address more urgent issues such as water scarcity, financial hardship, and rural depopulation. In reality, it is only on the foundation of community work that “low-carbon agriculture” becomes possible.

Regarding the specific goal of promoting green technology, policies also need to address farmers’ mistrust and unfamiliarity with new techniques. On 28 February, a report titled *Agricultural Green Transition in the Context of Chinese-style Modernisation*—authored by establishment experts and scholars with the participation of several social organisations—introduced low-carbon agriculture as a vital concept for China’s agricultural response to climate change. However, the report also found: “The promotion and popularisation of green agricultural technologies are essentially social behaviours that require social support and, in turn, produce social impacts. Yet, the process of China’s agricultural green transition has underestimated this.” In other words, if ordinary farmers cannot participate in these new technologies and methods, the goals of the green transition will be difficult to achieve.

Faced with these issues, civil society organisations possess the advantages of flexibility, professionalism, and proximity to the grassroots, allowing them to bridge the significant gap between policy formulation and implementation. The report calls for strengthening the capacity building of social organisations and increasing their voice in the transition process.

In fact, climate change has become a magnifying glass for rural development issues: it not only exacerbates the urban-rural divide and intergenerational inequality but also makes the situation of vulnerable rural groups even more precarious. Whether for governments or social organisations, if the logic of action does not incorporate smallholders and rural communities when responding to climate issues, they risk becoming mere executors of an external will, failing to truly enhance community resilience or achieve the “dual carbon” targets.

Achieving the climate goals set out in the Central No. 1 Document requires far more than lofty terminology like “low-carbon agriculture”, “resource census”, and “climate zonation”. The real challenge for the execution of the document—and the key to its actual implementation—is designing policies based on these concepts and tools that allow ordinary farmers to participate and benefit.

References

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *China Rural Revitalisation Development Report 2024*, 2025, China Agriculture Press

“Implementation Opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Implementing the Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Anchoring Agricultural and Rural Modernisation and Solidly Promoting Comprehensive Rural Revitalisation”, 19 January 2026, https://nyj.yl.gov.cn/yw/zslb/202602/t20260206_2073506.html

澎湃号 “China Meteorological Administration”, “Reporter’s Observation | What is the deeper meaning behind the Central No. 1 Document mentioning ‘Agricultural Climate Resource Census and Zonation’ again?” https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_32535311

State Council, *National Irrigation Development Overall Plan (2012-2030)*, 2013

Hu Xueping et al., “Analysis of the Causes of Continuous Drought in Southwest China from 2009 to 2013”, 2021, *Meteorology*, http://qxqk.nmc.cn/html/2014/10/20141006.html

Annual Central No. 1 Documents, etc.

Foodthink Author

Pei Dan

A writer who has returned to her true calling, focusing on climate change, the ecological environment, and the individuals impacted by these transitions.