COP28 Opens: The Urgent Need to Enhance Agricultural Climate Resilience | Roundtable Review

For farmers, the shifting climate means traditional planting and harvesting windows are growing increasingly unpredictable. Research by academics reveals that amid rural depopulation, farmers facing droughts or floods often have little choice but to scale back cultivation, simply due to a shortage of labour. Moreover, while China’s rural areas have established comprehensive disaster relief frameworks, these systems are nevertheless stretched to the limit when confronted with unprecedented extreme weather. Climate change further exacerbates the vulnerability of those left behind in rural communities—particularly the elderly, children, women, and low-income households.

What challenges will this pose for food security and rural development? As extreme weather becomes the new normal, how can we safeguard both our food supplies and our communities?

On the international climate negotiation agenda, food and agriculture are shifting from the periphery to the centre. Food systems account for nearly a third of global greenhouse gas emissions, and recent shocks—the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the mounting frequency of extreme weather events worldwide—have only intensified the global food crisis. These developments compel us to ask: what does a truly safe and resilient food and agricultural system look like?

This past September, Foodthink partnered with Tencent News’s series *Let’s Talk Science* to bring together meteorologist Wei Ke (Institute of Atmospheric Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences), political ecology scholar and associate professor Liu Juan (College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University), and associate professor Liu Jie (International Business School, Shaanxi Normal University). Together, they explored how farmers can navigate today’s climate volatility, and what adaptation strategies and disaster management mechanisms rural communities need to mitigate the compounding threats to their livelihoods.

Roundtable Panelists

Wei Ke

Meteorologist, Institute of Atmospheric Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences

I. The Tropical Belt is Shifting Towards the Poles

Second, could this warming and humidification in the north represent a long-term trend? This perspective also holds some scientific weight, as global warming is driving an expansion of the tropics towards the poles. According to observational data on various circulation indicators, the tropical zone in the Northern Hemisphere has shifted northwards by approximately one degree of latitude over the past few decades, equivalent to roughly 100 kilometres. While this shift is relatively modest, it is a clear and significant change. This means that previously arid regions in the north may gradually become wetter as the climatic zone expands northwards.

Therefore, assessing the wet-dry fluctuations in northern China likely requires examining two dimensions: the long-term trend and interdecadal variability. In my view, the climate changes observed in the north are the result of these two factors compounding one another.

Against the backdrop of global warming, if temperatures in northern China continue to rise, this will manifest in weather patterns as a ‘dry gets drier, wet gets wetter’ dynamic. As temperatures increase, the atmosphere’s capacity to hold water vapour also increases. Consequently, when rain does fall, the greater availability of moisture leads to more intense downpours. Conversely, because the air can absorb more moisture, rainfall becomes harder to trigger during dry seasons. The net effect is that precipitation in arid northern regions is highly likely to become even scarcer, particularly during the dry season.

II. Timing Farming Activities is Growing Increasingly Difficult

The second level stems from a profound impression gained during our surveys across various regions: farmers once had a solid grasp of the rhythms dictated by the solar terms and farming calendar, but uncertainty has grown, making it increasingly difficult to time agricultural activities correctly. Naturally, alongside the natural factors of climate change, this phenomenon is also tied to labour migration, rural land transfer, and shifts in crop structures. For instance, in parts of southern China where double-cropping rice was once the norm, farmers were thoroughly familiar with the planting cycle. Now, not only is the shifting climate itself hard to predict, but many left-behind farmers also have to stagger planting and harvesting schedules to cope with labour shortages. The rhythm of farming has clearly been disrupted.

In the past, when facing climate-related disasters such as flooding or drought, farmers would take proactive measures to mitigate damage, such as drainage or irrigation. Today, however, it is far harder to mobilise collective action. Faced with labour shortages, many smallholders tend to adopt avoidance strategies. They might reduce the area under cultivation, narrow the range of crops grown, or switch from double to single cropping. These are the practical coping mechanisms we see among smallholders today.

Another point worth noting is the widespread climate insensitivity among those stepping away from agriculture. I have felt this deeply myself. I only managed to visit rural areas in the south towards the end of last year. Arriving there, I was struck to see ponds cracked dry to the bottom and numerous fields of late-season rice with no harvest in sight—a stark and alarming scene. It was only through conversations with locals that I learned the region had already endured six months, or even longer, of drought. In reality, drought conditions in 2022 were widespread across the Yangtze River Basin, particularly in its middle and lower reaches.

Ordinary city dwellers are relatively insensitive to climate change, especially its impacts on agriculture, rural areas, and farmers. This is partly due to media coverage biases, but largely because people’s relationship with the land and natural climate is not as direct as it is for those living in the countryside. Of course, perceptions also vary among farmers themselves. Whether migrating for work or education, or relocating to urban centres, rural residents who leave the land no longer depend on agricultural production for their livelihood. Consequently, their connection to the climate is no longer as direct as it once was, or rather, they face fewer opportunities to be directly exposed to climate risks. If a smallholder’s hard work over a few mu of land yields nothing, the entire year is lost in vain. But a migrant worker in the city has many other ways to earn back a few thousand yuan. Their psychological perception of climate change is therefore completely different. Current living environments and the availability of alternative livelihoods create a differentiated “climate risk distance” between different groups.

III. If Water-Saving Irrigation Is So Beneficial, Why Do Farmers Resist It?

Four: Who Should Bear the Cost of Climate Adaptation

The second scenario represents a shared financial model between the government and individuals, typified by subsidised agricultural insurance. Currently, this takes two primary forms: centrally subsidised and locally subsidised schemes. The centrally subsidised programme primarily covers staple crop cultivation and livestock farming, with premiums largely funded by central, municipal, and district authorities, leaving farmers to contribute roughly 20 to 30 per cent. The locally subsidised variant acts as a supplement, offering broader coverage with local authorities shouldering a portion of the premiums. This mechanism serves as a vital buffer, helping smallholders mitigate losses following natural agricultural disasters.

The third category encompasses large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the development of agricultural water management systems. Given the substantial capital expenditure and extensive scale involved, these costs are predominantly shouldered by the state.

V. Can insurance really put farmers’ minds at ease?

Furthermore, when assessing climate-related losses, direct impacts such as crop failure and infrastructure damage are relatively straightforward to quantify. By contrast, indirect effects like the degradation of natural ecosystems and the loss of cultural assets are far more difficult to measure. These remain pressing challenges, with no clear consensus at the global level. Bringing us back to the question of who should bear the climate-related losses incurred by smallholder farmers, Liu Jie also touched upon agricultural insurance. According to relevant research and data, there are now over 200 types of agricultural insurance products eligible for government subsidies, offering a reasonably diverse range of coverage. However, our field research revealed considerable scepticism among farmers regarding these schemes. Ambiguities persist around premium payments, policy coverage, loss assessment, and claim payouts. Consequently, many farmers purchase insurance yet struggle to secure the compensation they anticipate when disasters actually strike.

Compounding this is the fact that smallholder incomes are inherently low. Under these circumstances, insurance premiums themselves add to production costs, leading to a relatively low uptake of these policies. When climate-related losses intensify, small-scale farmers are more likely to scale back cultivation or abandon their land altogether, rather than turn to insurance. This gradual withdrawal of smallholders from farming could, in turn, undermine national food security.

Ultimately, effectively addressing the nexus between climate disasters, agricultural production, and compensation will require holistic research and systematic policy frameworks. These must bridge macro-level policy design with effective grassroots governance.