COP28 Opens: The Urgent Need to Enhance Agricultural Climate Resilience | Roundtable Recap

For farmers, this means that the timing of agricultural cycles is becoming increasingly unpredictable. Research indicates that against the backdrop of rural hollowing, farmers facing climate disasters such as droughts and floods often choose to reduce planting due to a lack of labour. Furthermore, although a comprehensive disaster relief system has been established in rural China, it remains stretched thin when faced with record-breaking extreme weather. Climate change further exacerbates the vulnerability of marginalised groups in ‘left-behind’ villages, including the elderly, children, women, and low-income earners.

What challenges will this pose for food security and rural development? In a future of frequent extreme weather, how can we protect our livelihoods and our homes?

At the international climate negotiation table, food and agriculture are moving from the periphery to the centre. This is because food systems contribute nearly a third of global greenhouse gas emissions, and recent events—such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and frequent extreme weather worldwide—have exacerbated the global food crisis. These signals prompt us to reflect: what kind of food and agricultural systems are truly secure and resilient?

In September this year, Foodthink, in collaboration with Tencent News’ “Let’s Chat Science”, invited Wei Ke, a meteorologist from the Institute of Atmospheric Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Liu Juan, an Associate Professor and political ecology scholar from the College of Humanities and Development at China Agricultural University; and Liu Jie, an Associate Professor from the International Business School of Shaanxi Normal University. Together, they explored how farmers can cope in an era of frequent extreme weather, and what climate adaptation strategies and disaster prevention and relief mechanisms rural areas require to avoid the existential risks posed by compounded climate disasters.

Round Table Guests

Wei Ke

Meteorologist, Institute of Atmospheric Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences

I. The Tropics are Expanding Towards the Poles

Secondly, could this warming and wetting be a long-term trend? There is scientific evidence for this view, as global warming has caused the tropics to expand towards the poles. According to observational data from certain circulation indices, the tropical zone of the Northern Hemisphere has shifted north by approximately 1°, or about 100 kilometres, over the past few decades. While the shift is small, it is a distinct change. This means that previously arid regions in the North may gradually become rainier as the southern influences expand northward.

Therefore, measuring the dry-wet fluctuations in Northern China likely involves two dimensions: a long-term trend and decadal variations. In my view, the climate change in the North is the result of these two dimensions superimposing on one another.

Against the backdrop of global warming, if temperatures in Northern China continue to rise, the resulting weather pattern will be that ‘the dry becomes drier, and the wet becomes wetter’. Because as temperatures rise, the atmosphere can hold more water vapour. Consequently, when it does rain, the increased water vapour leads to more intense precipitation; similarly, because the air can hold more vapour, it becomes harder for rain to fall during dry seasons. The result is that precipitation in the arid regions of the North is likely to become even scarcer, particularly during the dry season.

II. The Increasing Difficulty of Timing the Farming Season

The second level is a profound feeling we had during our surveys across various regions: in the past, farmers had a certain mastery of the rhythms of solar terms and the farming season, but there is now far more uncertainty. It has become increasingly difficult to time the farming season. This phenomenon is, of course, linked not only to the natural factors of climate change but also to the migration of labour, rural land transfers, and changes in planting structures. For example, in some southern regions where double-cropping rice was previously common, people were very familiar with the rhythms of cultivation. Now, on one hand, the changes in the climate itself are hard to predict, and on the other, some farmers remaining in the villages must stagger their planting times to cope with labour shortages. The rhythm of cultivation has been clearly disrupted.

Previously, when facing climate disasters such as floods and droughts, farmers would take proactive remedial and improvement measures through drainage and irrigation. Now, however, many collective actions are difficult to mobilise. Given the labour shortages, many smallholders tend to adopt ‘avoidance strategies’—for instance, choosing to reduce the planting area, reduce the variety of crops, or switch from double-cropping to single-cropping rice. This is the practical coping mechanism for many small-scale farmers.

It is also worth mentioning the general ‘climate insensitivity’ that occurs as people move away from farming. I felt this deeply myself. Last year, I only had the opportunity to visit rural areas in the south towards the end of the year. Once there, I discovered that the ponds had dried up and cracked to the bottom, and many of the late-season rice crops had failed; the scenes were harrowing. It was only then that I learned the area had experienced drought for six months or even longer; in fact, drought was very widespread across the entire Yangtze River basin in 2022, particularly in the middle and lower reaches.

Ordinary people living in cities are relatively insensitive to climate change, especially its impact on agriculture, rural areas, and farmers. This is partly due to biases in media reporting, but largely because their relationship with the land and the natural climate is not as direct as that of those living in the countryside. Of course, perceptions among farmers themselves also diverge. Whether through migrant work, education, or relocating to cities, those from rural backgrounds who have detached from the land no longer rely on agricultural production for their livelihoods. Consequently, their connection to the climate is no longer as direct, or rather, their opportunities to be directly exposed to climate risks have decreased. If a smallholder painstakingly farms a few mu of land and the harvest fails, a whole year’s work is wasted. However, a migrant worker in the city has many other ways to earn back those few thousand yuan. Therefore, their psychological perception of climate change is entirely different. Current living environments and the substitutability of livelihoods have created differentiated ‘climate risk distances’ between people.

III. Water-Saving Irrigation is So Beneficial, So Why Don’t Farmers Adopt It?

4. Who bears the cost of climate adaptation?

The second scenario involves a shared burden between the government and the individual, such as policy-based agricultural insurance. Currently, there are two main forms: central government-subsidised policy insurance and local government-subsidised policy insurance. Central government-subsidised insurance mainly covers the cultivation of staple crops and livestock farming, with premiums largely borne by the central, municipal, and district governments, while individual farmers may pay around 20% to 30%. Local government-subsidised insurance serves as a supplement to the central scheme, offering broader coverage, with part of the premium covered by local governments. This is one way for smallholders to mitigate losses from natural agricultural disasters.

The third scenario includes the construction of farmland water conservancy infrastructure and similar projects. These require high investment and are generally large-scale, so the costs are primarily borne by the government.

V. Can insurance really provide farmers with a lasting safety net?

Furthermore, when we speak of losses caused by climate change, direct losses—such as crop failure or destroyed infrastructure—are relatively easy to assess. However, indirect impacts, such as the destruction of natural ecosystems or the loss of cultural assets, are far more difficult to quantify. These are ongoing challenges for which there is no clear global answer. Returning to the question of who should bear the losses incurred by smallholder farmers, Professor Liu Jie mentioned the role of insurance. According to relevant research and statistics, there are currently over 200 types of agricultural insurance products eligible for government subsidies, which is a fairly comprehensive range. Yet, during our research, we found that many farmers remain sceptical. There are numerous ambiguities regarding premium payments, the scope of coverage, loss assessment, and claim amounts; consequently, many farmers pay their premiums, only to find it difficult to receive the compensation they expected when a loss actually occurs.

There is also a more immediate problem: the income of smallholder farmers has always been low. In this context, insurance premiums further increase the cost of agricultural production, which diminishes the willingness to take out insurance. If losses driven by climate change intensify, smallholders are more likely to reduce their planting or even abandon their land altogether rather than purchase insurance. The gradual exit of smallholders from agricultural production could, to some extent, pose a threat to our food security.

Therefore, to truly resolve the issues between climate disasters, agricultural production, and compensation, we likely need holistic research and systemic policy solutions. It is essential to effectively align macro-level policies with grassroots governance.