High-Standard Farmland I’ve Seen, Farmed, and Worked On Over the Years | Reader Comments

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On 12 January, based on research conducted across several regions, Foodthink published an original article 《What’s Driving Down the Standards of “High-Standard Farmland”?》, which attracted comments from practitioners and researchers across the agriculture and engineering sectors nationwide. They shared their observations on the construction and operation of high-standard agricultural projects in their local areas, confirming that the issue highlighted in the article—the so-called “high-standard” fields failing to meet actual standards—is widespread in villages across Southwest, Northwest, and Central China. Farmers report that these upgraded fields are difficult to irrigate or even lack water, with poor planning leading to abandonment. Meanwhile, contractors are frustrated by difficult project conditions, strict oversight, and slim profit margins. What kind of farmland improvement can truly safeguard food security? Perhaps before embarking on rural construction and renovation, we should first listen humbly to the voices of frontline farmers and dispel the myth of large-scale agriculture. The following are comments left on the article via WeChat Official Accounts and Tencent News, lightly edited for clarity. To protect reader privacy and given that Foodthink lacks the capacity to fact-check every submission, all comments are published anonymously alongside the commenter’s IP location, with specific provincial, municipal, county, township, and village names obscured.

I. Why Has High-Standard Farmland Been Abandoned?

During Foodthink’s field visits, we found that in some villages, smallholder farmers were forced out following upgrades. Outside investors took over the renovated high-standard plots, but neither cultivated them properly nor harvested diligently. In some areas, yields actually fell below pre-renovation levels. Netizens from across the country shared similar accounts of abandonment. In many cases, the upgraded plots simply lacked sufficient water sources, with the abandonment of terraced fields under the “bringing rice up the mountains” initiative being particularly conspicuous. The policy of consolidating “small plots into large fields” has led to a one-size-fits-all levelling of land with vastly different soil types and topographies. When paired with standardised concrete irrigation channels, this approach often leaves higher ground baking dry while lower ground waterlogs.

Terraced fields might squeeze out a modest yield in the south, where natural rainfall is plentiful. But up north—in Northern Shaanxi, Gansu—farming is entirely at the mercy of the weather. You could call them fields, but no one would dare classify them as basic farmland. Which official who approved the project would guarantee that terraces in the north can reliably produce a stable grain supply? (IP: Ningxia)

Come see for yourself in Yunnan. The slopes are so steep that the so-called ‘high-standard’ farmland carved out here is completely unusable, and there is not a drop of water. (IP: Yunnan) 

It’s purely a cash grab. The ‘high-standard’ farmland in xxxx Town has no water at all, leaving vast swathes lying barren and abandoned. (IP: Chongqing)

◉On social media, terraces carved into barren hillsides have become the epicentre of abandoned ‘high-standard’ farmland. Image source: WeChat Official Account “Voice of South China”

 

Was any serious consideration given to regional differences? We’re on a plain over here. When irrigation is needed, some areas are desperate but simply can’t get any water. (IP: Jiangsu)
The field bunds on our local high-standard plots are four or five metres wide. From a distance, they look like aeroplane runways. Is there any real need for them to be that wide? (IP: Hunan)
My hometown is xx in Sichuan. Not sure who’s behind this ‘high-standard’ push, but local authorities, keen to curry favour with superiors and bolster their performance records, chopped down mature fruit trees to plant crops that are practically worthless. After so much effort to build a fruit and vegetable supply chain, they were forced to switch to grain production, and now every single plot is left to lie fallow. (IP: Guangdong)
◉ 22 November 2023. A nursery stock plot in the Hangzhou suburbs has been converted into high-standard farmland. Photo: Chen Jingjing

II. What Kind of “High Standard” Do Farmers Need?

In response to reports from farmers across various regions that construction has damaged topsoil fertility, Foodthink examined the three land-levelling methods outlined in engineering construction technical standards.When it comes to preserving soil fertility, the more convenience-driven the approach, the greater the damage to the land.Douyin user @EngineeringXiaoLi explained the differences between the three approaches: The first is the “row-reversal method”, which preserves the cultivated topsoil but requires meticulous handling and progresses relatively slowly.

The second is the “trenching method”, which allows for rapid progress and simultaneous operations, but merging the trenches can easily result in uneven soil fertility. Both of these methods require a combination of manual labour and machinery.

The final approach is the “full-scraping method”, which is well-suited to heavy machinery and highly efficient. However, it exposes a large amount of raw subsoil, making it difficult to restore soil fertility.

In 2022, the state issued the “General Rules for the Construction of High-Standard Farmland (GB/T 30600-2022)”, which lays down detailed specifications for field plot management, effective soil layer thickness, and arable land fertility, among other metrics. Yet neither these General Rules nor local standard documents specify which construction method should actually be used for land levelling.

In the comments section, several readers also shared their perspectives on how to build farmland infrastructure that ensures food security while adapting to local natural and social conditions.

Ideal high-standard farmland should involve a rational, locally adapted arrangement of infrastructure, including soil management, irrigation canals, and access roads. At its heart, it must work with the natural topography. It is the product of rural communities continuously adapting their agricultural environment over long periods, guided by local knowledge and sustained farming practice. However, in practice, beyond issues such as cutting corners, the most glaring omission in many renovation projects is a disregard for the land’s natural contours. Without properly understanding the topography, soil quality, or local livelihoods, these schemes simply impose a rigid, one-size-fits-all standard on the land.

High-standard farmland is not necessarily better when it is larger or neater. Its true purpose is to ensure that water can be efficiently directed onto, conserved within, and drained from this tract of land, whilst soil fertility is maintained. Oversized plots inevitably retain uneven ground: high spots leave crops parched, low spots waterlog them, and farmers are forced to construct ridges between them. Irrigation canals laid out in rigid straight lines often clash with the natural terrain; when large volumes of water are released, the water spills over the banks in the depressions whilst the higher ground remains dry. Even when the land is mechanically levelled, the process may simply expose infertile subsoil or even broken rock. These are situations I have observed firsthand during my fieldwork.

Nature requires millennia to form merely a few inches of topsoil. Disregarding the natural topography and established cropping patterns, any project branded ‘high-standard’ ultimately degrades the land’s productive capacity. (IP: Shandong)

We face a similar situation in XX City, Hunan: these renovation projects have degraded fertile land and reduced marginal plots to wasteland. This year’s rice harvest could easily fall to less than half of last year’s. I urge any communities yet to undergo field renovation to never bury the fertile topsoil beneath infertile subsoil. If they do, the land will take at least five years to recover. What was meant to improve the fields ends up destroying them. The state has invested heavily, yet standing before these vast, newly ‘standardised’ plots only breeds anxiety, and all the original plans come to nothing. (IP: Hunan)

It strikes me that those overseeing high-standard farmland projects simply lack an understanding of agriculture. They operate under the blind assumption that merely flattening the ground suffices. In reality, the levelled plots are little more than raw subsoil where crops fail to take hold. Rehabilitating such land demands massive quantities of farmyard manure and chemical fertilisers. For four or five years, there is only financial outlay and no harvest. If local farmers cultivate it themselves, the costs are prohibitive. If the land is leased, tenants who see no yield after a year or two will certainly withdraw further investment, leaving the fields to be abandoned. Might planners be urged to consider these practical realities? They dismiss traditional terraced fields built alongside mountains and rivers as inefficient use of space, expend enormous effort to level the hillsides, and ultimately achieve nothing. (IP: Yunnan)

The best agricultural policy is simply to refrain from unnecessary disruption. (IP: Beijing)

◉ A reader from Guangxi shared a photo and commented: If it’s just dug out and left unmanaged, can it really be called up to standard?

III. Contractors Have a Say Too

Both in Foodthink’s research and in reader feedback, the construction quality of high-standard farmland has consistently been a primary source of criticism. Following the publication of the article, numerous readers with experience in farmland construction stepped forward to share the difficulties faced by contractors. They pointed out that contractors are by no means guaranteed a profit, while also having to navigate complicated design and supervision requirements, not to mention potential conflicts with local villages. Crucially, designers typically trained in soil management and contractors with civil engineering backgrounds both lack adequate knowledge and experience when it comes to agricultural projects. On Douyin, project contractors have also reported that profit margins on high-standard farmland schemes have been steadily shrinking in recent years. One Douyin user noted: “A few years ago, profit margins could reach 30–50%, with every stage of the process taking a cut. But now, with fierce competition and downward pressure on prices, profits are capped at 10–20%. When controls are particularly tight, margins can drop below 5–7%.” Above all, there is a heavy burden of inspections, with the Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervisory Commission overseeing every stage, making it increasingly difficult to actually receive payments.

◉A Douyin user, @红光聊工程, shared insights on high-standard agricultural construction, prompting numerous peers to air their grievances.

Once central special funds are disbursed, contractors from the building and transport sectors often step in to handle high-standard farmland projects. These firms are frequently run by project managers who act like local bullies; if they refrain from bringing in local police to gang up on villagers who resist land requisition, that’s already a blessing. Under those circumstances, how could they possibly take the initiative to consult with villagers during construction?

When smaller contractors from the county level take on the work, village officials often insist that while the company is nominally awarded the contract, the actual construction must be carried out by local village labour. Both construction and design firms strongly resist this, because village teams rarely follow the blueprints. For instance, if the plans specify ten terrace steps, they’ll stubbornly build only five. While they may think it’s sufficient, it will never pass expert site inspections, forcing the design, construction, and supervision teams to collude on change documentation. The catch is that reducing ten steps to five is inherently non-compliant. Fabricating such documentation not only plants a time bomb for themselves but also for the reviewing experts. If the discrepancy ever blows up, no one in that professional circle will ever be able to work in the industry again.

The final, and most critical, point is this: whether you are in design, construction, or supervision, the people actually responsible for this work (especially on the design side), from junior technicians to project managers, make very little money. Not a single person is adequately compensated from start to finish, so how can anyone be expected to cooperate with all these bureaucratic hassles? Furthermore, in farmland water conservancy projects, designers typically come from a soil management background, while contractors usually have civil engineering training. In many small design institutes, you won’t find a single professional specialising in hydraulics or water management. Their understanding of irrigation often relies entirely on childhood exposure to rural life, and what passes for sound practice is mostly guesswork based on anecdotal experience. The reality is that three or five years of field experience is barely useful, while those with more extensive experience lack the stamina to stay on-site and work overtime day after day. It’s a complete deadlock. (Location: Hubei)

(Replying to the above) Exactly. Not a single person actually doing the work is paid enough. (Location: Shaanxi)

◉ On short-video platforms, amidst an explosive surge in funding for high-standard farmland projects, contractors claiming to have taken on the work report that the money is being diverted to plug the debts of local government financing vehicles, leaving them unable to secure their final settlement payments.

I once worked on a water-pumping station project where there was no water source—just a dry basin. The design proposed waiting for rain to pool there. I asked, “If it’s already waterlogged, who on earth needs the water pumped up?” When I asked the local farmers, they just shook their heads. (IP: Henan)

For high-standard farmland, shouldn’t the focus be on farm access roads, irrigation wells, and drainage ditches? Instead, rigid ratios are imposed—say, capping road expenditure at 20%, while mandating tree planting… Only for the trees to later be displaced by widened roads, uprooted and replaced with vegetable crops. (IP: Henan)

(Reply to above) Without those ratios, every penny would go to paving roads. The initial design drafts worked out with village committees always allocate around 50% to roads, leading to endless back-and-forth. But that’s not the real issue. The crux is that design fees are already rock-bottom, and local authorities then issue fiscal directives that slash them further. (IP: Hubei)

(Reply to post above) Anyone who understands the budget breakdowns truly knows how this business operates. (IP: Henan)

The visible roads look pristine, but the underground drainage is a shambles—and it’s far from an isolated case. (IP: Heilongjiang)

The benchmark wasn’t lowered; the standard itself was fundamentally an engineering metric from the outset. Applying civil engineering specifications to agricultural land that requires long-term, sustained fertility seals the outcome before the project even begins. (IP: Hunan)

IV. Investment Reduced to Spectacle: How to Correct the Course

Yet are the contractors truly “professional”? As some readers argue, we must look past the outward “facade” of high-standard farmland projects to confront the structural issues beneath—

If we’re talking about the problems inherent in high-standard farmland construction, there are plenty. What farmers complain about in the fields and what locals grumble about are merely symptoms. Without tackling the root causes, how can the symptoms ever be resolved?

1. Local governments care too much (They’re basically obsessed with the funding, because it mostly comes from intergovernmental fiscal transfers, national bonds, or central and provincial funds—cold, hard cash! Why the obsession? Diversion. How? By setting up agricultural investment companies. These companies act as the project owners, then hire state-owned enterprises for construction. Suddenly, the money can be spent however they see fit.)

2. The project owners are too “professional” (Agricultural investment companies are fundamentally in the business of investment. That’s their expertise. How could they possibly understand farming? Even if they wanted to learn, would they master it in under ten years?)

3. The design is too “scientific” (How can you expect a bunch of twenty-something men and women to understand agriculture? They don’t, so how do they design? They follow regulations, guidelines, and official documents. Some claim designers never visit the site and just draft plans over maps at their desks. I’ll defend them: they certainly did visit. They just had no idea how to farm, so they fell back on their own ideas and plans, patched together with standard regulations. As for what the actual farmers need, they had no clue, so of course the fields end up feeling impractical when planting time comes.)

4. The construction contractors are too “professional” (Whether a private firm or a state-owned enterprise wins the bid, they are highly professional. Calling them unprofessional is the amateur talking. But their expertise isn’t in farmland development or agronomic needs; it’s in cost accounting and project planning. Most SOEs or private firms simply calculate their profit margin, take their cut, and subcontract the rest. They never roll up their sleeves to do the actual work!)

5. On-site construction is too “professional” (The people actually building on site or advancing funds are chosen on one criterion: they’ve got money and can front the costs. Why? Because the government diverted the funds at the start! They may not be farming experts, but they’re ruthless at the maths. Their cost control is razor-sharp, which means they use the cheapest materials possible.) (IP: Sichuan)

Coincidentally, an independent observer who has long studied agriculture, rural areas, and farmers has described the high-standard farmland system as little more than an external performance.

As a strategic investment, high-standard farmland development represents the largest capital outlay for rural revitalisation during the 14th Five-Year Plan. The central government alone has allocated over 700 billion yuan, and when you factor in local government spending, financial sector investment, and private capital, the total undoubtedly exceeds 1 trillion. The overall investment directed at rural revitalisation during the 14th Five-Year Plan stands at 10.8 trillion. Yet in reality, the results have been abysmal, and public trust has been eroded.

Over the past five years, I’ve penned countless complaints and posted numerous videos on the subject. At times, my view has been rather extreme: I’ve suspected that high-standard farmland actually reduces crop yields, and that the annual figures touting increased production are simply untrue. But the more troubling issue is the underlying mechanism and logic at play, which has become widespread. On the surface, it looks orderly—standards, procedures, oversight are all in place. In truth, it’s all for show. Everyone is “performing,” striving to meet this set of ostensibly correct, modern requirements. Even the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ current inspections are merely another act in this production.

It’s the same with high-standard farmland, and likely even more pronounced in other areas of rural revitalisation, particularly industrial development. I suspect the pattern repeats in high-tech sectors like semiconductors and AI. Loud political slogans, a dense web of procedures and bureaucracy, and a tacit, somewhat uneasy societal acceptance have combined to create the uniquely “performative” China of today. This “performance” is, of course, distorted, artificial, and exorbitantly expensive, yet it has become an inescapable necessity.

Could deeper reforms resolve these issues? Unlikely. Doing so would require dismantling entrenched interests and established rules. (IP: Zhejiang)

According to reports, in 2024 the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs launched a special “look back” campaign to review the quality of high-standard farmland construction projects. Focusing on projects initiated since 2019, the initiative aims to identify shortcomings in the quality of on-site irrigation infrastructure, the disbursement and use of funds, and the maintenance of engineered facilities. Some commentators have noted that the relevant departments are already “working themselves to the ground.”
The state has spent a fortune on high-standard farmland, while department staff work themselves to death with their liabilities ballooned beyond all measure. We’ve reached a point where no one wants the job, and the public remains dissatisfied. If everyone is unhappy and finding it so difficult, I’d suggest we stop. Drop the “high-standard” label. Just build small-scale agricultural water conservancy facilities. Focus on securing water access and fixing the roads. Leave soil fertility improvement as a separate initiative. (IP: Sichuan)

5. Outside Large-Scale Operators vs. Family Farms

Like the farmers Foodthink met during its field visits, many readers are sceptical that the contractors building high-standard farmland and the large-scale lessees actually intend to farm it well. The prevailing assumption is that they are purely chasing subsidies. In our previous articles, we have indeed noted that outside large-scale operators often face upfront costs, such as having to dig new drainage ditches on top of already-upgraded plots. They also bear extra labour costs, and effective field management requires a level of expertise they often lack.

If it isn’t locals farming large areas, but outsiders or big corporations, they aren’t looking to increase income through yield. Some are just here to game the state’s major subsidy programmes. None of them actually want to farm. (IP: Shandong)

For outside large-scale growers who don’t understand agriculture, losses are inevitable! Upgrading high-standard farmland is highly complex; it must be adapted to local conditions and designed for practical flexibility, otherwise it will backfire! (IP: Chongqing)

We have this where I live too. Large-scale lessees planted sorghum and soybeans, but didn’t harvest them in autumn. They just left them in the fields, until some bold local farmers went in and picked some. (IP: Shandong)

The real prize is the high-standard farmland subsidy. (IP: Guangdong)

Here we have rice being planted on hillsides. Leased by outsiders. Yield is just 50 kg per mu. They’re just living off state subsidies. (IP: Zhejiang)

Turning hills into prime farmland? These people are just here for the subsidies, aren’t they? I heard from local farmers that for a dryland-to-paddy conversion project, the subsidy runs to tens of thousands of yuan per mu. (IP: Guangxi)

They’re gaming the subsidies. The official upgrade cost is tens of thousands of yuan per mu, but the actual cost is just a few thousand, never more than 5,000. (IP: Guangdong)

They’re making their money from the subsidies. (IP: Guangxi)

They came strictly for the handouts. (IP: Chongqing)

Researchers have also observed that while the state aims to “raise the benchmark” for agricultural infrastructure through public services, these policies can fall short. Moreover, commercialised agricultural technology services do not necessarily reach the largest group of growers: smallholder farmers. Agricultural sociology and economics research has firmly established that outside capital venturing into rural farming often fails to adapt to local conditions. When local smallholders are not the managers or beneficiaries, they tend to lack motivation, and bosses lacking agricultural experience struggle to maintain smooth operations. In China’s history of smallholder farming, characterised by extremely high-density labour input, a contractor’s wage bills can never compete with the relentless self-exploitation of family farms. Many scholars and field investigators have documented cases of outside operators planting medicinal herbs or digging fish ponds, only to leave when profits failed to materialise. When agricultural value-added is too low, operators are often left with no choice but to try to squeeze value directly from the land. After all, capital seeks profit margins, not merely high yields.

In this context, the key to ensuring abundant grain harvests may lie in how to foster better collaboration between large-scale operators capable of coordinating production and smallholder farmers, ensuring that smallholders retain a voice throughout the production process.

I have a strong sense that there is a misalignment between public and market services. Huge amounts of public funding are poured into civil engineering projects, yet those designing them often lack agricultural knowledge, leading to waste. Meanwhile, modern machinery like tractors, harvesters, and drones are allocated entirely through market mechanisms, with operators naturally favouring large-scale farms. During peak seasons, smallholders struggle to find mechanised services, and when they do, the prices are significantly higher than what large farms pay. Many large machines are indeed government-purchased, but in practice, their operation is contracted out to private firms that small farmers rarely access. At least in our area, part of the reason farmers are reluctant to farm is the inconvenience of accessing machinery services. I hope this can be improved! (IP: Zhejiang)

Lin Zihan, a sociologist who has conducted fieldwork in rural Anhui, told Foodthink that numerous studies have shown large-scale farming does not necessarily boost land productivity. Yet the ‘myth’ of the American-style mega-farm persists, and subsidy policies frequently favour scaled-up operations. Lin also notes that with smallholders widely adopting agricultural machinery, expanding scale doesn’t necessarily mean ‘land consolidation’ via the transfer of management rights. It can equally take the form of ‘service scaling’, delivered through socialised agricultural services. Under this model, machinery uniformly handles most stages—ploughing, sowing, crop management, and harvesting—while farmers retain management rights and independently carry out manual tasks such as weeding and irrigation. Although smallholders may cede control over agricultural inputs and techniques under this arrangement, they remain highly motivated to work their fields.

Policies are already being recalibrated, with initiatives now encouraging ‘moderate-scale operations’ of around 100 mu. During past visits, Foodthink has also learned that several prefectures in Sichuan are compiling case studies of households whose agricultural income roughly matches the wages available from working away from home elsewhere—family farms represent a key model of moderate-scale farming. In crop production, bigger is indeed not always better.

 

Editor: Pei Dan, Tian Le

Published by Foodthink