When the Burning Ban Becomes the Last Straw for Smallholders
From late last year until April, the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai—a popular tourist destination—was frequently shrouded in a thick haze. On 29 March, Chiang Mai was ranked by IQAir as the most polluted city in the world, with an Air Quality Index (AQI) of 188, which is 17.4 times the World Health Organization’s air quality guidelines.
A significant portion of these air pollutants comes from the burning of sugarcane. In the northern, northeastern, and central regions of Thailand, the period from December to February coincides with the annual sugarcane burning season.
The sugarcane referred to here is sugar cane used for sugar extraction. Its leaves are numerous, long, and sharp. Manual harvesting requires a great deal of effort to clear the sugar-free cane tops and leaves. Since sugar accumulates primarily in the main stalk and the stem has a thick fibrous layer that protects the internal sugar from fire, burning the fields before cutting has become the preferred choice for many farmers.
Caught between air quality and their own livelihoods, sugarcane farmers are trapped in a recurring dilemma over whether or not to burn.
According to official statistics from this year, the average daily intake of burnt sugarcane across Thailand accounted for approximately 15% of the total sugarcane crushed. However, some mills failed to comply, accepting burnt sugarcane in proportions exceeding 25%.
Among these, a mill in Udon Thani accepted the highest volume of burnt sugarcane at 43%, making it the province with the highest proportion of sugarcane burning in the country. Located in northeastern Thailand, Udon Thani is the largest sugarcane-growing province, with 120,000 hectares dedicated to the crop, accounting for 10% of the province’s total area.
With the entire nation threatened by air pollution, pressure mounted on the Thai government. Various departments took separate actions to urgently “deal with” the sources of pollution.
On 14 January this year, the Thai Ministry of Industry ordered the closure of the Udon Thani mill on the grounds of violating safety laws, as punishment for its continued over-purchase of burnt sugarcane.
In closing the mill, however, the government effectively punished the farmers.
Many farmers had already burnt and harvested their cane before heading to the mill, only to discover upon arrival that it had been shut down. Nearly 2,000 lorries were stranded, queuing one after another at the mill gates. Anxious farmers waited at the entrance, hoping the government would relent and allow the mill to reopen. As the wait dragged on, the sugarcane began to rot.
Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra believes that farmers should bear responsibility for the air pollution. According to The Nation Thailand, regarding the severe air pollution in Bangkok, she stated that if farmers are found burning land to clear it, the government will suspend all subsidies from 1 June this year until 31 May next year.
Farmers in the region noted that the Udon Thani mill had been purchasing their burnt sugarcane for many years; this was the first time the government had acted so decisively to close a mill.
II. Why Sugarcane Burning Persists
By 2019, the government pushed forward stricter measures, including further support for the use of agricultural machinery, the establishment of no-burn zones, a subsidy of 120 baht (approximately 25.68 yuan) per tonne for fresh sugarcane, and a limit on the purchase of burnt sugarcane by mills, capped at 30% and gradually reduced to 5% over the following two years.
Initially, the combination of subsidy incentives and penalties did work. The proportion of burnt sugarcane dropped from 60% to 26% within three years. However, the progress was short-lived, and the burning rate began to rise again after 2021. In the 2023-2024 season, the proportion of burnt sugarcane stood at 30%.
The reason is simple: the cost of harvesting fresh sugarcane is roughly three times that of burning. When selling burnt sugarcane, the penalty is about 6 yuan per tonne, while the subsidy for fresh sugarcane is about 26 yuan per tonne—neither the penalty nor the incentive is large enough to bridge the cost gap between the two methods.
After doing the maths, many farmers find it cheaper to pay the fine and continue burning.
In truth, farmers are aware of the benefits of fresh sugarcane, such as easier acceptance by sugar mills, higher sugar content, and better air quality. Burning sugarcane releases vast amounts of air pollutants in a short time, including particulate matter, carcinogenic organic compounds, and trace metals. The health consequences of exposure to these pollutants primarily manifest as respiratory diseases, such as asthma and lung cancer. The most direct victims are, naturally, the farmers and the surrounding communities.
However, for them, livelihood takes precedence over health, and thus the burning persists. Facing poor results, the government’s response has been to further increase fines. For the 2024-2025 season, the Ministry of Industry took stricter measures early on, such as reducing the number of collection points for burnt sugarcane and significantly increasing the penalty for burnt cane to approximately 26 yuan per tonne, in a further bid to deter burning and encourage the harvest of fresh sugarcane.
Khon Kaen is one of the major sugarcane-growing hubs in Northeast Thailand; 9.6% of its land is dedicated to the crop, second only to Udon Thani. Every harvest season, labour shortages become the primary challenge here. Chairat makes a living growing sugarcane, cassava, and rice. To balance costs against market risks, he has developed a shrewd strategy: for the 2023-2024 season, he harvested 80% of his sugarcane fresh and the remaining 20% by burning.
This decision was based on a careful calculation of several factors, including the ratio of burned cane accepted by sugar mills that year, the price of sugar, and other production costs. Chairat explains that he harvests freshly specifically to ensure the cane is accepted by the mills, rather than to chase a higher purchase price.
“Doing this this year doesn’t guarantee I’ll do it again next year. Costs increase every year, situations change, and sugar prices fluctuate—all of which affect next year’s planting plan and harvesting method,” Chairat says. “While freshly harvested cane fetches a higher price, the cost of growing it is also rising.”
Chairat’s experience is far from an isolated case. Data shows that the cost of sugarcane production for Thai farmers hit a record high in the 2022-2023 season, reaching 1,122 Thai baht (approx. 247.34 yuan) per tonne. This was driven by several factors: the rising price of fertilisers and pesticides, increased labour costs due to worker shortages, and a global surge in energy prices which drove up transport and processing costs.
Climate change is also becoming an increasingly volatile cost variable. In 2022, Chairat’s fields suffered significant flooding, making the subsequent harvest difficult. The muddy soil prevented harvesters from entering the fields, and since delaying the harvest risked the cane lodging (falling over), he had to hire manual labour. By the time the harvest season arrived, Chairat found that labour costs had hit an all-time high.
In 2024, drought led to poor crop growth, and Thailand’s sugar yield dropped to its lowest level in 13 years. As the pressure of farming mounts, some smallholders have abandoned sugarcane entirely.
III. Smallholders: Bearing the Brunt, Reaping the Least
For some small-scale farmers, the focus has shifted from making a profit to simply surviving—survival has become their primary concern.
Currently, the most viable alternative to burning is the use of sugarcane leaf strippers and mechanical harvesters. The Thai government has been promoting mechanisation primarily by lowering loan interest rates and supporting domestic manufacturers of harvesters, but so far, these loans have failed to incentivise the majority of farmers. Simply put, without direct financial aid or machinery support from the government and sugar mills, smallholders cannot afford the transition.
Data from the Thai-Chinese Daily indicates that as of 2021, Thailand had only 2,000-2,500 sugarcane harvesters, capable of harvesting 60-75 million tonnes annually. If all sugarcane across the country were to be harvested fresh, the number of harvesters would need to increase to 3,400-4,500. More importantly, not all regions’ planting areas and methods are suitable for mechanical harvesting.
Thai smallholders typically grow sugarcane on small, private plots of land that are adjacent to one another. It is impossible for every farm to purchase its own machinery due to the exorbitant cost and low frequency of use. A single sugarcane harvester can cost between 8 million and 12 million baht (approx. 1.71 million to 2.57 million yuan), excluding fuel, yet it is only used for three to four months during the harvest season each year.
“We would need to grow more than 10,000 tonnes of sugarcane before we could even consider buying a machine,” says Ganok, a Thai sugarcane farmer. He believes the cost of machinery should not fall entirely on the farmers: “The factories should help us by purchasing the machinery. Instead, they push the burden onto the farmers while sugar prices fall and labour costs rise.”
While these support measures for farmers seem insufficient, perhaps there is another way—how can the non-sugar residues be turned from waste into wealth?
Between 2015 and 2036, the Thai government introduced a series of alternative energy development plans. Through these, the government hoped to maximise the use of sugarcane resources by supporting the biochemical industry—for instance, using bagasse for electricity generation and molasses for ethanol production. This aimed to stabilise agricultural prices while securing farmer income by increasing the added value of sugarcane. The plan predicted that sugarcane could generate an additional $9.6 billion in economic value annually and provide sugarcane-related employment for 300,000 households.
Unfortunately, smallholders have been excluded from this development plan.
Under Thailand’s 1984 Sugarcane and Sugar Act, 70% of the total annual sugar production revenue is allocated to the farmers, with the remaining 30% going to the mills. However, revenue from non-sugar sugarcane by-products, such as ethanol and electricity, is not shared with the farmers.
The Northeast Sugarcane Growers Association has called for a revision of the Sugarcane and Sugar Act in recent years. The association hopes that farmers can receive a corresponding share of income from by-products to ensure greater financial stability. They also want the government to invest in infrastructure and provide support or subsidies for labour costs to reduce the incentive to burn sugarcane.
Professor Sirima Panyamethikul, a Thai scholar, argues that reducing air pollution requires community involvement in creating sustainable solutions, rather than a one-size-fits-all ban on agricultural burning: “Farmers must be provided with more practical and feasible alternatives.”
However, after being repeated so many times, such appeals seem to have become correct but futile platitudes. Rising production costs, market volatility, and policy injustices leave sugarcane farmers with no choice but to exploit the environment to scrape together a tiny profit. When they are branded as “polluters” and forced to “pay for pollution”, abandoning agriculture becomes the only way out for some.
And it is not just the sugarcane farmers of Thailand who are trapped in this dilemma of “pollute or leave”.
