Low-Carbon Agriculture Enters China’s No. 1 Document: What It Means

I. Climate Change in the No. 1 Document

This does not mark the first time the No. 1 Document, which has centred on agriculture, rural areas and farmers for 22 consecutive years, has addressed the link between climate change and farming. As early as 2010, when climate change was mentioned for the first time, it was highlighted in the second paragraph, which laid out the core themes: “The impact of climate change on agricultural production is growing increasingly significant, while favourable conditions and positive factors for rural and agricultural development continue to accumulate. At the same time, a range of traditional and non-traditional challenges are compounding and becoming more pronounced.” This demonstrates that policymakers had long recognised the profound impact climate change would have on China’s agriculture.

In 2012, once again in the second paragraph, the document linked climate change with the challenges facing China’s agriculture, conveying a palpable sense of urgency: “The impact of global climate change is deepening, putting greater pressure on our shortage of arable land and freshwater resources. Risks and uncertainties facing agricultural development have risen markedly, making the task of consolidating and improving the positive momentum in agriculture and rural areas more arduous.”

That same year, in the section on agricultural technology extension, the document called for “substantially increasing subsidies for key technologies and best practices to prevent and mitigate disasters, ensure stable production, and boost yields in agriculture.” It also aimed to expand the coverage of public meteorological services for rural and agricultural sectors, raising the technological standards for agricultural weather services and rural meteorological disaster defence.

Interestingly, from that point on, the word “climate” was conspicuously absent from the No. 1 Document for years. It did not return until 2022, coming back with renewed prominence in the very first paragraph. The tone was notably stern, placed alongside the year’s most critical priorities: “Currently, the global novel coronavirus pandemic continues to spread, the world economic recovery remains fragile, and the challenge of climate change is prominent. The tasks of economic and social development in our country are extraordinarily heavy and arduous.” Furthermore, in the section on effectively preventing and responding to major agricultural disasters, it proposed to “strengthen research into the medium- and long-term impacts of climate change on agriculture.”

Yet, throughout the No. 1 Documents of these three years, climate change lingered more like an invisible, looming shadow, with little in the way of concrete operational directives. It was not until 2023 that the climate agenda finally gained a tangible policy lever in the document. Under the section on strengthening agricultural disaster prevention and mitigation capacity, it proposed “conducting research to launch a new round of agricultural climate resource surveys and agricultural climate zoning.”

The results of this research are reflected in the 2026 Central No. 1 Document: the word “research” has been removed, and the language shifts to direct action: “Conduct agricultural climate resource surveys and zoning, strengthen monitoring, forecasting and early warning for meteorological, hydrological and geological hazards, and enhance the capacity to respond to extreme weather events.”

II. Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Climate Change

Over the past few years, multiple unseasonal droughts, floods, and extreme weather events have struck annually. Catastrophes once deemed “once-in-a-fifty-years” or “once-in-a-century” are now occurring with alarming regularity. Last year alone serves as a stark illustration. Devastating floods continued to plague the country, particularly in northern China. Beginning on 23 July, torrential downpours struck regions across the north. Thirteen national meteorological stations recorded historical extremes across two key indicators, while Yi County in Hebei Province saw such intense rainfall that it was said to have “received a full year’s worth of rain in a single day”. In Miyun, Beijing’s hardest-hit district, a heavily capitalised farm was completely washed away. Stripped of its topsoil, the land remains uncultivable to this day, resulting in economic losses of approximately 30 million yuan.

By October, prolonged rainfall and waterlogging across the Huang-Huai-Hai plain and the wider North China region severely disrupted the autumn harvest. Wheeled combine harvesters struggled to navigate the waterlogged fields, while drying infrastructure such as grain dryers and towers proved inadequate. Consequently, vast quantities of maize were left to mould and spoil in farmers’ storage. In rural Hebei, standing water pooled in low-lying, flat fields with no viable drainage, while further afield, southwest China endured a prolonged drought stretching through winter and into spring.

These extreme weather events can, to varying degrees, be attributed to climate change. Among them, the flood devastation in the key northern farming regions has been particularly stark. This year’s Central Government No. 1 Document specifically proposes “strengthening the flood control and drainage systems in northern regions, while moderately raising engineering standards”, and underscores the “allocation and deployment of disaster relief machinery.”

A source close to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs told Foodthink that responding to extreme disasters driven by climate change is currently a key priority for the ministry. In recent years, the development of China’s agricultural production system has centred on bolstering agricultural resilience to prevent, mitigate, and respond to disasters. For instance, in 2024, the ministry established an information-sharing mechanism with meteorological, water conservancy, and emergency management authorities to monitor disaster impacts. It also holds monthly consultations with the meteorological administration to publish climate trend updates, among other initiatives. The ministry has furthermore partnered with the four provinces and autonomous regions across Northeast China to rehabilitate drainage ditches in northern farmland.

If climate change has previously appeared in the Central No. 1 Document merely as an agricultural risk requiring adaptation, then this year’s first mention of “low-carbon agriculture” serves as a positive signal that the sector is now expected to play an active role in emissions reduction. Although concepts akin to “low-carbon agriculture,” such as green development and ecological farming, regularly feature in the No. 1 Document, they have predominantly been framed around curbing pollution and safeguarding food security. Looking beyond the document itself, climate change—whether viewed through the lens of mitigation or adaptation—has been the overarching backdrop for China’s agricultural green development since 2020.

Yet the true test of “low-carbon agriculture” will be whether it delivers tangible benefits to farmers, rather than forcing them to foot the bill for the green transition. From bans on burning crop residues to the heating struggles in northern villages, there are already cautionary examples of poorly handled policies that call for serious reflection.

In September 2025, Foodthink released the report *Research on Action Paths for Rural Social Organisations in Responding to Climate Change*, which highlights that farmers have long stood as both the most perceptive observers and the most vulnerable victims of climate change, despite receiving little attention or support.

At the same time, farmers face inequalities in both public discourse and policy. From a mitigation standpoint, small and medium-sized farms—particularly those practising ecological agriculture—generate lower emissions, both in production and daily life, than large-scale industrial agriculture and urban residents. Yet their contribution to emission reduction goes unrecognised. Conversely, from an adaptation perspective, they are far more vulnerable and sensitive to climate impacts than other groups.

In practice, Foodthink’s interviews with numerous rural social organisations and frontline workers reveal that, spurred by climate funders, many groups initially entered rural areas with a clear mandate to tackle emissions and pollution. Their original aim was to drive climate action, specifically by cutting methane emissions—one of the primary greenhouse gases generated by crop cultivation.

Yet once they encountered the complex realities of rural life, they frequently found themselves having to address farmers’ more pressing concerns first—such as water scarcity, financial strain, and rural hollowing out. In effect, ‘low-carbon agriculture’ can only be pursued on the foundation of solid community work.

To achieve the specific objective of rolling out green technologies, policy must also tackle farmers’ scepticism and unfamiliarity with new methods. On 28 February, a report titled “Green Transformation of Agriculture in the Context of Chinese Modernisation”—drafted primarily by state-affiliated experts and scholars and co-published by several non-governmental organisations—also frames low-carbon agriculture as a pivotal concept for the sector’s response to climate change. Nevertheless, the report observes: “The dissemination and adoption of green agricultural technologies are fundamentally social processes that require broad societal support and, in turn, generate social impacts. China’s agricultural green transition has, however, underestimated this reality.” Put simply, if everyday farmers cannot meaningfully engage with these new technologies and practices, the ambitions of a green transition will be difficult to realise.

In addressing these challenges, civil society organisations bring flexibility, specialist expertise and a strong presence at the grassroots level, enabling them to bridge the considerable gap between policy intent and on-the-ground delivery. Consequently, the report calls for enhanced capacity building within the third sector, alongside greater recognition and influence for these organisations throughout the transition process.

In reality, climate change has also become a magnifying glass for rural development challenges: it not only widens the urban–rural divide and intergenerational inequalities, but also leaves vulnerable groups in the countryside increasingly exposed. When governments or social organisations address climate issues, failing to integrate smallholder farmers and rural communities into their policy framework risks reducing them to mere conduits for external agendas, undermining genuine community resilience and the achievement of the dual carbon targets.

Achieving the climate objectives set out in the Central No. 1 Document will fall short if we rely solely on sweeping terminology such as “low-carbon agriculture”, “resource inventories”, or “climatic zoning”. The real test of implementation—and the key to grounding the No. 1 Document in practice—lies in designing policies, built upon these concepts and tools, that enable ordinary farmers to actively participate and benefit.

References

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *China Rural Revitalisation Development Report 2024*, 2025, China Agricultural Press

“Implementation Guidelines of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Enacting the CPC Central Committee and State Council’s ‘Opinions on Anchoring the Modernisation of Agriculture and Rural Areas and Solidly Advancing Comprehensive Rural Revitalisation’”, 19 January 2026, https://nyj.yl.gov.cn/yw/zslb/202602/t20260206_2073506.html

The Paper Account “China Meteorological Administration”, “Reporter’s Observation | The Central No. 1 Document Mentions ‘Inventory and Zoning of Agricultural Climatic Resources’ Again: What Is the Deeper Significance?” https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_32535311

State Council, *National Irrigation Development Master Plan (2012–2030)*, 2013

Hu Xueping et al., “Analysis of the Causes of Consecutive Droughts in Southwest China (2009–2013)”, 2021, *Meteorological Monthly*, http://qxqk.nmc.cn/html/2014/10/20141006.html

Previous years’ Central No. 1 Documents, among others

Foodthink Contributor

Pei Dan

A writer who has returned to her craft, focusing on the lived experiences of individuals amid climate change, ecological shifts, and broader societal transformations.