When Drones Take Over Crop Protection, Are Small-Scale Farmers Still Needed?
As global warming intensifies, fall armyworm infestations have emerged as a new threat to global agricultural production. During our fieldwork in the summer of 2019 in Jixian County (a pseudonym) on the North China Plain, the arrival of the fall armyworm put the entire county on ‘wartime’ footing.
The fall armyworm, commonly referred to as such and also known as the autumn armyworm, is a major transboundary migratory pest under global alert by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It is characterised by its long-range migratory capacity, prolific breeding rates, and potential for severe crop damage, primarily targeting crops such as maize and sorghum.
At the time, the summer-planted maize on the North China Plain was in the tasselling and silking stage, a period critical for yield determination. Pest outbreaks during this phase can severely impact harvests, making timely intervention essential. Consequently, upon detecting signs of the fall armyworm, Jixian County immediately established a ‘Fall Armyworm Monitoring, Early Warning, and Control Leading Group’ and deployed agricultural drones for pest control.
Nevertheless, farmers in Jixian grew increasingly anxious over their inability to secure drone-based crop protection (colloquially known as ‘drone spraying’) services in a timely manner. With a limited number of agricultural drones available, demand could not be met across the county within a short timeframe. Farmers had no say in the prioritisation schedule, leaving them to wait in acute anxiety, much like ants on a hot pan.
I. From Mastery to Detachment: The Evolving Relationship Between Farmers and Technology
During this era, agricultural technicians travelled to rural areas to instruct farmers in advanced techniques. Jixian farmers not only benefited from publicly provided agricultural extension services, but also acquired more scientific methods for grain cultivation and crop protection.
As one villager recounted: “Back then, seeds, chemical fertilisers and pesticides were all allocated by the government. The village agricultural team leader and technicians taught us how to use them, specified the correct dosages, and explained the benefits in clear detail.”
In this period, high-quality agricultural inputs promoted by the government, such as phosphate fertilisers and nitrogen-phosphorus compound fertilisers, alongside techniques like crop transplanting and wheat rust control, were directly integrated into farming practices. A fleet of large agricultural machinery, including tractors from Poland and Czechoslovakia, entered the daily routines of Jixian farmers. Through hands-on guidance from agricultural technicians, farmers mastered the operation of these machines, leading to a substantial increase in grain yields.
Following the reform and opening-up in 1978, agricultural technology extension entered a market-driven phase. Agricultural input retailers championed the introduction of advanced techniques to rural areas through paid services. As the market economy developed, many agricultural technicians ‘went into business’, opening farm supply shops in townships. This grassroots network subsequently shouldered the vital task of disseminating farming technology.
To local growers, these retailers were often neighbours and fellow villagers. Years of regular interaction fostered a close, familiar rapport. Whether they were former agricultural technicians or practitioners with robust farming knowledge, they earned the strong trust and preference of the farming community.
Farmers in Jixian County routinely visited these retail outlets to purchase seeds, pesticides, and fertilisers. Some would even pull diseased plants from their fields and bring them directly to the shopkeepers for an immediate ‘diagnosis’, enabling them to get ‘targeted remedies’ straight away.
These new agricultural operators have invested substantial capital, command advanced agricultural technologies, and have achieved a 100% mechanisation rate. At this point, farmers are no longer merely recipients of technology dissemination or hands-on practitioners; a simple phone call is all it takes to secure the necessary technical services: “We simply cover the costs. We don’t care what pesticides they use or in what quantities, as long as the job gets done.”
It is precisely this shift in the model of agricultural technology dissemination that has given rise to the difficulties faced by Jixian County’s farmers in applying agricultural techniques, as described at the beginning of this article.
II. Do farmers still need to master agricultural techniques?
During our field research, we observed that an increasing number of technology dissemination projects in Jixian are being “bundled” and awarded to a single agricultural technology firm—Lantianmeng Agricultural Technology Co., Ltd. (a pseudonym, hereafter referred to as “Lantianmeng”). Between 2014 and 2019, Lantianmeng successively undertook more than a dozen specialised unified pest and disease control projects for crops in the county, including winter wheat initiatives such as “one spray, three protections” and mid-to-late stage maize programmes labelled “one spray, multiple effects”.
For a variety of reasons, the direct extension of agricultural technology to individual farmers is becoming increasingly impractical.
Firstly, independent smallholders operate according to their own established habits and perspectives, making it difficult to align them with the requirements for new technology adoption.
Take plant protection extension initiatives as an example. To meet green pest management targets, the government has stipulated the “use of low-toxicity, high-efficiency pesticides” alongside a mandate to “reduce overall pesticide usage by 6% over three years.” Yet farmers seek chemicals that are both cost-effective and potent. Low-toxicity options are often “slow-acting and pricey,” leading to the common view among rural households that “it’s better to buy the highly toxic varieties; the pests die much sooner.”
By contrast, Lantianmeng Company maintains that the pesticides used during drone operations comply with government guidelines, and that aerial application inherently reduces chemical usage: “When applying herbicides via drone, the dosage must be cut by more than 30%; otherwise, the crops will suffer phytotoxicity.”
Secondly, emerging agricultural business entities are well-capitalised and maintain sizable fleets of crop-protection drones, enabling highly efficient plant protection operations.
According to Lantianmeng, by 2021 the company operated over 300 drones. A single unit can treat 500 to 800 *mu* (roughly 67 to 107 hectares) per day (based on a 6 to 8-hour shift), with annual service coverage exceeding 700,000 *mu*.
In practice, the high efficiency of drone-based plant protection is underpinned by substantial project subsidies. Under this project-driven model, service providers purchasing equipment such as drones receive targeted government funding, while farmers contracting these technical services benefit from agricultural support grants.
Consider the 2020 Jixian wheat “one spray, three protections” initiative. Per the project’s funding allocation, participating farmers accessed drone spraying services at a cost of 8 yuan per *mu*, with the government subsidising the remaining 10 yuan. Without this financial support, farmers would face a minimum outlay of 18 yuan per *mu*.
III. What have aerial pesticide sprays brought to farmers?
The spraying schedules for individually operated smallholders are inherently fragmented. One family might need treatment today, another tomorrow, and their fields are often scattered in small, disjointed plots across the landscape.Although farmers are willing to pay operators for the work, Lantianmeng Company is, in practice, reluctant to take it on.
During our fieldwork, operators voiced their frustrations: “A tiny plot means the drone has to turn before it even gets going. It’s barely airborne before it needs to land. It’s nearly impossible to precisely control the volume of pesticide and water.” With no other option, farmers have been forced to pool together with several neighbours who also need spraying, coordinating collectively to call in the operators.
When spraying demand peaks, Lantianmeng Company will naturally prioritise large-scale farms. Smallholders are left queuing up, often missing the optimal agronomic window before they finally receive service—a scenario that closely mirrors the opening of this article.
In 2019, an incident occurred when operators provided services to smallholders: a winter aphid infestation had spread from nearby vegetable greenhouses to the wheat fields, rendering the initially calculated pesticide dosage ineffective and forcing a costly re-spray.
For millennia, China’s agricultural development and farming practices have been built upon the model of smallholder family farming. Farmers have possessed detailed agronomic skills, drawn upon generations of experience, and worked the land diligently to secure their harvests. Yet with the advent of crop protection drones, these traditional skills have been rendered obsolete.
Furthermore, agricultural drones demand specialist training, present significant operational difficulties, carry multiple potential hazards, and function in highly variable field conditions. These high barriers to entry mean that untrained farmers simply cannot operate them, leaving service purchases as their only option.
Historically, farmers would exchange labour with neighbours and regularly seek plant protection advice from local agro-chemical retailers, weaving a tightly knit web of familiar, reciprocal relationships. Today, drone spraying replaces this dynamic: a single phone call brings the operators, who spray the fields, collect their fee, and depart.
In Jixian alone, over 21,000 smallholder families continue to farm the land. How do we overcome these barriers to technology adoption? How can farmer cooperatives and organisational structures better connect smallholders with technical services? And how can we ensure that smallholders genuinely master agricultural knowledge and techniques? These questions ought to sit at the heart of policy deliberation.
Edited by: Ze’en